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Laws that decriminalize public drunkenness continue to use the
police as the major intake agent for public inebriates under the "new"
public health model of detoxification and treatment. Assuming that
decriminalization introduces many disincentives to police intervention
using legally sanctioned procedures, we hypothesize that it will be followed by a statistically significant decline in the number of public inebriates formally handled by the police in the manner designated by the
Using an "interrupted time-series quasi"law in the books."
experiment" based on a "stratified multiple-group single-I design," we
confirm this hypothesis for Washington, D.C., and Minneapolis, Minnesota. However, through intensive "microanalysis" of these two jurisdictions, we show that Minneapolis, in responding to strong business
pressure, developed several alternative means of keeping the streets
clear of transient public inebriates while Washington, D.C., treated
decriminalization as an opportunity to shift police priorities and relied
on informal "safe zones" to handle the inebriate population.

I. INTRODUCTION
Decriminalization as an alternative strategy for handling
public drunkenness took hold in the 1960s and early 1970s (Kittrie, 1971; Morris and Hawkins, 1969; Schur, 1965; Schur and
Bedau, 1974).1 The regional and national forces that coalesced
around this issue as reform-oriented policy subsystems (Freeman, 1965; Fritschler, 1969) focused on both the illegitimacy and
impracticability of the attempts by the system of criminal justice to handle this social and public health problem (Nimmer,
1971:102-5). In states where decriminalization eventually ocThis article is based on a larger study of the decriminalization of public
drunkenness funded by LEAA-NILECJ, Grant No. 74NI-99-0055. Those
parts of the study that deal with police discretion as an explanation for the
impact of decriminalization, and with the analysis of alternative policies
for dealing with the pickup and delivery of public inebriates, are contained
in our final report (Aaronson et al., 1977b) and in another journal (Aaronson et al., 1977a, 1978). We gratefully acknowledge the many persons who
commented on earlier drafts and criticized the methodological development of this paper- Richard Abel, Egon Bittner, Bruce Bowen, Gene Glass,
Dorothy Guyot, Michael Hindus, Laura Irwin, James Levine, Dennis
Palumbo, David Perry, H. Laurence Ross, Peter Rossi, Charles Ruttenberg, and George Silberman.
1. By the end of 1976, some 24 states had enacted the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws' Uniform Alcoholism and Intoxication Treatment Act (1971) or essentially similar legislation. Well over half
the states have decriminalized public drunkenness. Many others have diversionary strategies in cities where criminal statutes remain in effect.
See Grad et al. (1971); U.S. Department of H.E.W. (1971); Nimmer (1971).
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curred either through legislation or judicial action, reformers
paid little attention to the potential reaction of the police.
They simply assumed that the police would continue to serve
as intake agents for public inebriates under the "new" public
health model of detoxification and treatment.
This article empirically evaluates the impact of decriminalization on police performance in Washington, D.C., and Minneapolis, Minnesota. We question the facile assumption that the
police will routinely perform this new task. Specifically, we hypothesize that decriminalization will be followed by a statistically significant decline in the number of public inebriates
formally handled by the police in the manner designated by the
"law in the books."
The conceptual basis for this hypothesis is derived from
the literature on organization theory and from studies of police
behavior. 2 For example, it can be argued that as a result of the
removal of the criminal sanction, the intake of public inebriates
will no longer be viewed by patrol officers or the command
structure as a proper or important task (Wilson, 1971:49).
Decriminalization also eliminates critical organizational incentives that motivate patrol officers to carry out this often messy
and time-consuming job.3 Indeed, the very fact that the officer
is no longer being asked to enforce the criminal law provides a
source of dissonance. Further, police intake of inebriates
under a public health mandate requires the cooperation of two
different public service bureaucracies that diverge in both organization and values. Such a fragmented authority structure
is a potential impediment to goal achievement.
Thus, given the broad discretionary powers available to implementing agencies and their respective street-level bureaucrats (Davis, 1975), we would argue that any newly formulated
task that runs counter to the organizational and individual selfinterests of a critical public service bureaucracy is very unlikely to achieve full implementation unless these new mandates are supported by their own incentives at both the
2. As indicated in the authors' note, police discretion as an explanation for
the police behavior discussed herein is not treated extensively in this article. There is a voluminous literature on police discretion by political
scientists, sociologists, and legal and criminal justice scholars, e.g., Davis
(1975); Goldstein (1960); La Fave (1965); Skolnick (1967); Wilson, J.Q.
(1968). Studies of police discretion that are particularly relevant to the enforcement of public drunkenness include Gammage et al. (1972); Bittner
(1967); Nimmer (1971); Pittman and Gordon (1967); Rubington (1970).
3. For example, departments have often given the same credit for such arrests that they award for other misdemeanors and for traffic citations.
Jerry V. Wilson, the former Police Chief of Washington, D.C., has noted
the importance of this incentive (1975).
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administrative and street levels (Musheno et al., 1976). In
short, decriminalization introduces numerous disincentives to
formal police intervention using approved means (Aaronson et
al., 1977a, 1978).
Our research design reflects the growing body of literature
that merges the common threads of empirical impact analysis
and public policy analysis (Dye, 1972:291-96). This "policy impact study" empirically evaluates the impact of state judicial
and legislative mandates on agency responses (Campbell and
Ross, 1968; Glass et al., 1971; Ross, 1975; Zimring, 1975). Thus
we seek to contribute to correcting the "upper court bias" associated with public law research (Dolbeare, 1967) and to developing the literature of policy analysis that empirically assesses
the way public agencies interpret the law (Medalie et al., 1968;
Milner, 1970; Ostrom, 1973).
II.

DECRIMINALIZATION: TRACING THE PHASES AND
SOURCES OF LEGAL REFORM

One can divide decriminalization proposals into those that
are accompanied by treatment alternatives and those that are
not (Aaronson and Sweeney, 1975; Aaronson et al., 1977c; Titus,
1973). Although those proposals without a treatment scheme
may include regulatory guidelines (e.g., gambling and obscenity laws), they are primarily intended to permit a previously
prohibited activity by eliminating the criminal sanction. Alternatively, proposals linked to treatment alternatives are usually
designed to provide a more effective means of regulating an activity. The movement to decriminalize public drunkenness is
an example of this latter category.
Washington and Minneapolis have experienced three legal
phases in the handling of public inebriates: a criminal phase, a
transitional phase, and a public health phase. In both jurisdictions, the transitional phase was marked by judicial decisions
that overturned convictions of chronic skid-row inebriates for
drunkenness. Decriminalization and the emergence of the
public health phase were the product of legislation that required the establishment of new institutions for servicing the
public inebriate population.
A.

Washington, D.C.

Prior to Easter v. District of Columbia (361 F.2d 50, D.C.
Cir., 1966), the public inebriate in Washington was handled
within the criminal process. The usual procedure involved a
police arrest for alleged violation of D.C. Code § 25-128, which
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made it a crime to be "drunk or intoxicated in any street, alley,
park, or parking in any vehicle in or upon the same or in any
place to which the public is invited or at any public gathering,
and no person anywhere shall be drunk or intoxicated and disturb the peace of any person." Violations of this statute were
punishable by a fine of not more than $100 and/or imprisonment for not more than 90 days.
The legal challenge to this public intoxication statute in the
Easter case relied, in part, on the fundamental principle of
criminal responsibility that criminal sanctions may be applied
only to voluntary action (see Robinson v. California, 390 U.S.
669, 1962). In Easter, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia held that the defendant could not be
convicted of public intoxication because, as a chronic alcoholic,
he had lost the power of self-control with respect to the use of
alcoholic beverages and thus, under a local statute as well as
under traditional legal principles, he could not be convicted for
his involuntary intoxication. 4 However, there were .factors that
substantially limited the impact of this ruling. 5 It applied only
to the "chronic alcoholic." Public intoxication remained a
4. The Court in Easter cited D.C. Code § 24-501 et seq. authorizing courts in
the District of Columbia to take notice of the fact that a chronic alcoholic
is a sick person in need of treatment and authorizing the court to order
such treatment. Further, a chronic alcoholic was defined in the code as a
person who has lost "self-control" because of the use of alcohol. Considering these provisions in the context of the act as a whole, the court concluded that Congress had intended that criminality should not attach
where responsibility is lacking, i.e., chronic alcoholism (361 F.2d 51-53).
The Court also relied heavily on Driver v. Hinnant 356 F.2d 761 (4th
Cir. 1966), concluding that a chronic alcoholic cannot have the mens rea
necessary for criminal responsibility. It was also suggested that criminal
punishment under such circumstances might offend the constitutional prescription against cruel and unusual punishment (361 F.2d 53-55).
5. The potential of Easter as a catalyst for national reform of the drunkenness laws was subsequently blunted by the Supreme Court's decision in
Powell v. Texas (392 U.S. 514, 1968), which rejected the contention that
criminal prosecution of the chronic public inebriate constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. The recent Supreme Court decision in O'Connor v.
Donaldson (422 U.S. 563, 1975), dealing with a "right to treatment," might
appear to offer a new avenue for attacking incarceration of the inebriate, at
least where the confinement is involuntary. The Court there held that
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process is violated where a state involuntarily confines a mentally ill person who is not dangerous to self or to others,
if no treatment is provided.
However, involuntary confinement of the public inebriate in criminal
and decriminalized jurisdictions is often premised on a finding of dangerousness (see Grad et al., 1971) thereby raising a question left open by the
Donaldson case-can a dangerous person be involuntarily confined where
no treatment is afforded? In decriminalized jurisdictions (and many jurisdictions that were formally criminal), confinement is often limited to a
short "sobering up" period. In the decrimininalized jurisdiction, treatment is usually provided if confinement continues and confinement is usually based on some consent. Of course, what constitutes "consent" for an
intoxicated person is itself a difficult legal question.
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crime but there was increased uncertainty whether an arrest
would result in a conviction. Further, the lack of any systematic therapy for the chronic inebriate resulted in a "revolving
door" that was even more of a sham than the previous criminal
process. The result for the police was general confusion (Wilson, 1975).
On August 1, 1968, the District of Columbia Alcoholic Rehabilitation Act (P.L. 90-452, 82 Stat. 618, 1968), went into effect, a
direct result of Easter and its chaotic aftermath. The Act directs all public officials in the District of Columbia to "take cognizance of the fact that public intoxication shall be handled as
a public health problem rather than as a criminal offense" (Alcoholic Rehabilitation Act D.C. Code Annot. § 24-521 et seq.).
Nevertheless, the statute retains the assumption that simple
public intoxication is sufficient ground for public intervention
regardless of the wishes of the intoxicated individual. The police are retained as the legal instument for removing intoxicated persons from the streets, but they pick up "patients"
under a public health statute that reads:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any person
who is intoxicated in public: (1) may be taken or sent to his home or to
a public or private health facility; (2) if not taken or sent to his home or
such facility under paragraph one shall be taken to a detoxification
center. [D.C. Code 24-524]

The Metropolitan Police Department promulgated regulations recognizing intoxication (General Order No. 8, 1968) and
dividing intoxicated persons into three classes: (1) those not
endangering the safety of themselves or other persons or property (D.C. Code § 25-218), (2) those who endanger the safety of
themselves or other persons or property (D.C. Code § 25-218),
and (3) those charged with criminal offenses other than those
specified in D.C. Code § 25-218 (General Order No. 11, 1968).
The police department remains the primary intake agent
for all three classes. Persons picked up under the first category are taken home or to the Detox (the Detoxification
Center) and no arrest notation results (other forms are substituted). Public inebriates who do endanger the safety of themselves or others (a criminal offense), are arrested and taken to
the Detox, where the medical officer is given a detainer authorizing their transfer to jail when detoxified. Although those in
the third category should also be taken to Detox, it lacks adequate security; therefore any person who is considered a potential escapee is presently treated like any other criminal.
Easter provided the initial catalyst for change in the legal
status of public drunkenness in the District of Columbia. The
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general public was not significantly involved in the subsequent
formulation of new policies. As with most such changes (see
Bachrach and Baratz, 1970), it is primarily attributable to an
identifiable set of individuals and groups (a policy subsystem)
which, for nearly twenty years, had sought a revision of the
city's laws for dealing with public drunkenness. 6 Coordinated
by the Washington Area Council on Alcoholism and Drug
Abuse, these forces included members of city and federal criminal justice reform commissions, the news media, civil libertarian groups, public health institutions, and alcohol reform
groups. This policy subsystem was instrumental in prodding
Congress to enact the Alcoholic Rehabilitation Act and has continued to serve as a watchdog over the implementation of
decriminalization in the District.
Although all the coalition members backed Easter and the
Alcoholic Rehabilitation Act, their reasons for supporting these
reforms varied, reflecting differences in professional expertise
and interest. The criminal justice reform commissions and the
civil libertarians stressed constitutional protections, importance of freeing the courts from "noncriminal" responsibilities,
the costs of prosecuting public inebriates, and the need to concentrate limited resources on more serious crimes. The alcoholism reform groups and officials of public health institutions
emphasized the provision of emergency services for the inebriate and the role of decriminalization as a stepping stone for
resocializing and rehabilitating chronic inebriates. 7 We found
no indication that coalition members had discussed potential
conflict among these goals despite the very real possibility that
this may sabotage new governmental programs (Aaronson et
al., 1977a, 1978; Musheno et al., 1976)..
It is important to note that the Metropolitan Police Department neither volunteered, nor was asked to participate in this
policy subsystem. Some members of the coalition simply assumed that the department would be opposed to decriminalization. And Jerry Wilson, then police chief, has since explained
that the department was preoccupied with other matters.
The city was in a state of crisis, with street disorders occurring or
threatening to occur almost weekly, with the Poor People's Campaign
6. Interview with Mary Kidd, Executive Director, Washington Area Council
on Alcoholism and Drug Abuse, Washington, D.C. (July, 1974).
7. None of the members of the coalition focused on the goal of keeping the
streets clear of "transient" inebriates once decriminalization was introduced. We have found that this goal is often ignored by the advocates of
decriminalization but becomes a significant problem for police departments once the business community and residents begin to lodge complaints.
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absorbing much of the time of senior officials of the department, as
well as diverting patrol officers to special details, and with sharp upward trends developing in serious crime and narcotics traffic. During
1968 and 1969, public inebriation was clearly a lesser priority for the police department specifically, or for the city, generally. [1975:15-16]

Subsequent reform efforts in other jurisdictions have included
police departments in the formulation of policy so as to obtain
accurate information about the street activity of inebriates and
assure a high level of police cooperation in implementing noncriminal alternatives.8
B.

Minneapolis, Minnesota

From 1889 until 1966 Minneapolis applied Section 340.96 of
the Minnesota Statutes, which makes it a criminal offense to
become drunk "by voluntarily drinking intoxicating liquors."
The first sign of change was the creation of the Pre-Court
Screening Committee (formally entitled the Court Committee
of the Task Force on Homeless Alcoholics) by Hennepin
County Court Services in 1966, to review drunkenness cases
and recommend disposition to the bench. 9 The Committee had
a membership of approximately twelve persons who represented a range of organizations most of which provided services for chronic alcoholics (e.g., Alcoholics Anonymous, the
Salvation Army). The majority of drunks interviewed by the
Committee were skid-row types familiar to the revolving door
of criminal justice. 10
But the major change occurred on May 22, 1967, with the
passage of the Hospitalization and Commitment Act (Minn.
Stat. Ann. §§ 253A.01-121, 1971), which provides for voluntary,
involuntary, and emergency hospitalization and treatment of
mentally ill and drug dependent persons, including intoxicated
persons. The language governing pick-up and treatment of
public inebriates is as follows:
8. In Kansas City, the police department played a central role in the formulation of a noncriminal alternative. In fact, a member of the department sits
on the Board of Directors of the "Sober House," a detoxification and rehabilitation facility. Similarly, the St. Louis Detoxification Center was the
first alternative facility sponsored by a police department.
9. Interview with Jim Pearson, Chemical Dependency Program Specialist,
Hennepin County Alcohol and Inebriate Program, Minneapolis (June 9,
1975).
10. Interview with George Spano, Probation Officer, Hennepin County Municipal Court, Minneapolis (July 3, 1975).
11. The term "inebriates" does not include individuals who are merely intoxicated in public, but only chronic alcoholics: "inebriate person means any
person determined as being incapable of managing himself or his affairs
by reason of the habitual and excessive use of intoxicating liquors, narcotics or other drug" (§ 253A.02(4)).
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A peace or health officer may take a person into custody and transport him to a licensed hospital, mental health center or other facility
equipped to treat alcoholism. If the person is not endangering himself
or any other person or property the peace or health officer may transport the person to his home.
Application for admission of an intoxicated person to a hospital,
mental health center or other facility equipped to treat alcoholism shall
be made by the peace or health officer taking such person into custody
and the application shall contain a statement given by the peace or
health officer stating the circumstances under which such person was
taken into custody and the reasons therefor. Such person may be admitted to a facility specified in this provision for emergency care and
treatment with the consent of the institution. [Hospitalization and
Commitment Act § 253A.04]

Essentially, this Act provided police officers with an additional option for handling individuals intoxicated in public. No
special treatment facilities for inebriates were authorized
under the legislation and the health officer clause was developed to acknowledge the use of ambulance services to transport intoxicated persons.
During this transitional period, the next legal attack on the
criminal processing of public inebriates came from the Minnesota courts. On April 7, 1967, Bernard Fearon was arrested for
violating Minnesota Statutes § 340.96. As a defense to this
charge, Fearon argued that the statute did not apply to him because he was a chronic alcoholic who, by virtue of his condition, was incapable of controlling his consumption of alcohol.
The Municipal Court of Ramsey County found Fearon guilty as
charged.
Fearon appealed to the Supreme Court of Minnesota, reiterating his statutory interpretation but now adding the claim
that the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment barred application of the statute to the chronic alcoholic who, as a symptom of his disease, appears
intoxicated in public. On March 21, 1969, the state Supreme
Court held that the statute did not apply to the chronic alcoholic (State v. Fearon, 238 Minn. 90, 166 N.W.2d 720, 1969). By
so ruling, the Minnesota courts recognized that chronic alcoholism is a disease to be treated, not a criminal offense that
should be punished. The court based its decision on five
grounds: (1) "Voluntary drinking" under § 340.96 means drinking by choice. The statute does not apply to the chronic alcoholic whose drinking is caused by his disease and therefore
cannot be controlled (166 N.W.2d 720, 722-23). (2) A person
cannot be convicted of committing a crime when the necessary
mens rea is lacking. This would preclude conviction of the
chronic alcoholic even if "voluntary" were omitted from the
statute (166 N.W.2d 720, 722). (3) Although the United States

AARONSON, DIENES AND MUSHENO

413

Supreme Court upheld a drunkenness conviction under a similar Texas statute (Powell v. Texas 392 U.S. 514, 1968), it did so
with serious reservations. These reservations indicate substantial doubt about the constitutionality of such statutes (166
N.W.2d 720, 724). (4) The decision follows the position of most
contemporary authorities regarding the treatment of chronic alcoholics (166 N.W.2d 720, 724-25). (5) The Minnesota Legislature, by adopting the Hospitalization and Commitment Act of
1967, intended the chronic alcoholic should be considered a person in need of care, not punishment (166 N.W.2d 720, 725).
Although Fearon held that the Hospitalization and Commitment Act did supersede § 340.96 in the case of chronic alcoholics, it did not invalidate local ordinances. In Minneapolis,
police continued to use Chapter 37.9 of the City Ordinances to
arrest intoxicated persons for disorderly conduct. Like the
Easter case in Washington, the Fearon decision was viewed by
municipal criminal justice officials in Hennepin County as a
shift in emphasis rather than an abandonment of the criminal
approach to public drunkeness.
But on March 29, 1971, the Minnesota Legislature completely eliminated the criminal processing of public drunkenness (Minn. Stats. § 340.961, eff. July 1, 1971). The new
provision stated that drunkenness was not a crime, and nullified any inconsistent municipal ordinance. It left law enforcement personnel with only three choices for dealing with a
drunken person in a public place: (a) take the person into "custody" and transport him to a facility equipped to treat alcoholism and provide for emergency care (for a maximum of 72
hours of involuntary treatment); (b) take the person home if he
is not endangering himself, others, or property; or (c) leave the
person where he is found.
The legislature also committed resources for the establishment of an alternative care and treatment system. Each area
mental health board throughout the state was made responsible for providing one or more detoxification centers for the custody, care, and treatment of inebriates and drug dependent
persons (Minn. Stat. Ann., §§ 245.68(h)-(k), Supp. 1977). Hennepin County opened its first facility on the date decriminalization became effective.
On May 23, 1973, additional legislation outlined the permanent administrative structure, broadened both the services
available to individuals with drinking problems and the classes
of individuals who qualify as recipients, and explicitly sanctioned civilian pick-up of public drunks (Treatment for Alcohol
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and Drug Abuse Act, Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 254A.01-.17, Supp.
1972).
In Minnesota the policy subsystem supporting decriminalization included the following forces: the traditional alcohol reform lobby (e.g., alcohol treatment groups, clergy); state
commissions and associations; civic groups (e.g., the League of
Women Voters); legal professionals; and mental health professionals. 12 Individuals who pressed for decriminalization were
often affiliated with more than one. For example, members of
Alcoholics Anonymous might also be professionals in the state
and county bureaucracies that service alcoholics because the
state's alcoholism treatment program has permitted recovered
alcoholics to be therapists and care givers ever since 1954.13
The reformers directed their efforts at three levels of the
governmental process: the courts, the state legislature, and
county officials. Thus even prior to decriminalization, informal
approaches to the noncriminal handling of public drunks
emerged in local jurisdictions (e.g., the Hennepin County PreCourt Screening Committee). Reform activity also accounted
for the smooth transition from a criminal to a treatment approach in Hennepin County. A citizen's task force with liaison
to professionals was appointed by the county commissioners in
anticipation of decriminalization. The task force and its professional volunteers conducted the search for the first receiving
center, hired staff, and purchased all the necessary materials
4
prior to July 1, 1971.1
Given the policy subsystem identified above, it is not surprising that the resulting legislation sought three goals: ending
the jurisdiction of local courts over this problem, improving
emergency services for the public inebriate, and increasing the
opportunities for resocializing public inebriates. The primacy
of public health concerns was assured by entrusting implementation of the decriminalization mandate to a broad-based
agency dominated by public health professionals, the Department of Mental Health, Mental Retardation, and Chemical Dependency.
As in the District of Columbia, the Minneapolis Police Department was only marginally involved in deliberations con12. Interviews with Jim Pearson (supra note 9) and Dale Simonson, Attorney
at Law, Minneapolis (June 17, 1975).
13. Interview with Paul Thorne, Director of Hennepin County Alcoholism Receiving Center, Hennepin County Department of Mental Health, Mental
Retardation, and Chemical Dependency (MH/MR/CD), Minneapolis (June
4, 1975).
14. Interview with Jim Pearson (supra note 9).
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cerning decriminalization. Thus, no member of the policy
subsystem spoke for the critical community value of keeping
the street clear of transient inebriates.
RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA COLLECTION
To test the impact of decriminalization, we carried out an
"interrupted time-series quasi-experiment" (Campbell and
Stanley, 1963) based on a "stratified multiple-group single-I
design" (Glass et al., 1975). Specifically, we collected monthly
rates of arrest for public drunkenness (pre-decriminalization)
and of police deliveries to detoxification facilities (postdecriminalization) for the two experimental cities: Washington,
D.C., (a high arrest jurisdiction) and Minneapolis (a moderate
arrest jurisdiction).15 We also collected monthly arrest rates for
two control cities that have not implemented decriminalization:
16
Houston and San Francisco.
As many scholars well know, time-series quasiexperiments often require a laborious effort to find relevant, reliable data that provide enough observations to allow sophisticated analysis. 17 Since we were studying four different
municipalities, we were not able to collect an equivalent
number of monthly observations for each or to observe them
over the same time period. Furthermore, the date of
decriminalization is different in the two experimental jurisdictions.
Graphs 1 through 4 depict these differences (see the Appendix for monthly intake rates for all jurisdictions) and also
indicate the placement of the intervention line for each experimental jurisdiction based on two criteria: the effective date of
decriminalization in each jurisdiction, and the date that the
public health facility opened to receive clients. In Minneapolis,
the Alcoholism Receiving Center opened on the date
decriminalization became effective-July 1, 1971. In Washington, D.C., decriminalization became effective on August 1, 1968,
III.

15. By "high arrest jurisdiction," we mean a jurisdiction whose police department has made yearly drunkenness arrests of over 2,000 per 100,000 population (Washington had a yearly average of 5,522 per 100,000 for 1966, 1967).
By "moderate arrest jurisdiction," we mean a jurisdiction whose police department has made yearly drunkenness arrests of less than 2,000 per
100,000 population (Minneapolis had a yearly average of 1,625 per 100,000
for 1966, 1967).
16. We selected control jurisdictions that would be comparable to our experimental jurisdictions in terms of the following criteria: (1) projected
change in policy (whether or not a jurisdiction was anticipating
decriminalization); (2) citywide socioeconomic indicators; (3) nature of the
public drunkenness problem; and (4) availability of monthly arrest data.
Houston is roughly matched with Washington, D.C., and San Francisco
with Minneapolis. For a full description of our site selection process see
Aaronson et al. (1977b).
17. Observation requirements for sophisticated analysis are discussed in
Campbell and Stanley (1963).
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GRAPH 3
MONTHLY POLICE ARRESTS FOR PUBLIC INTOXICATIONa:
HOUSTON, TEXASb
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a. Based on official statistics of Houston Police Department, Houston,
Texas.
b. The monthly arrest rate representing the midpoint of the monthly data
collected was designated as "0." All other monthly arrest rates were
recalculated to represent a percentage increase or decrease from the
midpoint. The actual monthly police arrest rates for Houston are listed in
the Appendix.

GRAPH 4
MONTHLY POLICE ARRESTS FOR PUBLIC INTOXICATIONa:
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIAb
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a. Based on official statistics of San Francisco Police Department, San
Francisco, California.
b. The monthly arrest rate representing the midpoint of the monthly data
collected was designated as "0." All other monthly arrest rates were
recalculated to represent a percentage increase or decrease from the
midpoint. The actual monthly police arrest rates for San Francisco are
listed in the Appendix.
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but the Detoxification Center was not fully operational until
November 1; we designated the latter as the point of intervention.
IV.

FINDINGS

The data provide considerable support for our decriminalization hypothesis. The intake rate in Washington, D.C., seems
to fall prior to the point of intervention, apparently in response
to the confusion produced by Easter (see Graph 1). According
to former police chief, Jerry Wilson, "there was some concern
among police immediately after the Easter decision that a police officer might become civilly liable because of the perceived
requirement for determining who was an alcoholic and who
was not before each arrest of an inebriate" (1975:15). However,
the drop in arrests following Easter does not represent a statistically significant change in the level of intake. 18 On the other
hand, the computer program, CORREL, which computes
autocorrelations and partial autocorrelations for raw data (see
supra note 18) shows a statistically significant reduction of 764
in the estimated level of police intakes per month following
decriminalization.' 9 In Minneapolis, where the mean monthly
arrest rate under the criminal law had been much lower than in
Washington (641 compared to 3152), the reduction of 263 in the
estimated level of police intakes per month is even more dramatic.20 A simple visual scanning of the data from our control
jurisdictions shows that no similar change occurs in police departments where criminal sanctions against public drunkenness are unaltered (see Graphs 3 and 4).21
Does this mean, then, that one effect of decriminalization is
increased neglect of the public inebriate population? Rather
than concluding from the above analysis that significantly more
inebriates are being left on the street since decriminalization,
we also investigated a series of alternative dispositions and
control factors that could not be analyzed under the stratified
multiple-group single-I design. The results demonstrate the
18. Fortunately, Professor Gene V. Glass of the University of Colorado has
developed a computer program, CORREL, which computes autocorrelations and partial autocorrelations for raw data. CORREL also includes a
seasonal option for identifying cyclic series. He applied his program to
our data for Washington, D.C., and Minneapolis. The data were analyzed
as p=o, d=l, q=1 (integrated moving averages) with a seasonal component
(cycle=12). Using Easter as an intervention pointed for Washington, D.C.,
this analysis produced a T=1.05 with 106 degrees of freedom which is not
statistically significant (furthermore, the estimated intervention effect is a
positive, not a negative, 337).
19. T=3.20, significant at .001 with 106 degrees of freedom.
20. T=-4.84, significant at .001 with 102 degrees of freedom.
21. Professor Glass advised and we concurred that visual scanning of the control jurisdiction data in Graphs 3 and 4 adequately establishes that no similar effect is taking place.
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importance of "microanalysis" in tracing the impact of legal
mandates on adminstrative agencies.
For each experimental jurisdiction we analyzed whether a
change in the recidivism rate or in the size of the drinking population after decriminalization might explain the apparent reduction in police pick-ups.
We also examined alternative dispositions. The reform
legislation in both jurisdictions allows an individual to admit
himself to the detoxification facilities and grants the police two
other options: to take the person home or to deliver him to a
facility equipped to handle alcoholism (e.g., a hospital). The
Minnesota legislation also authorizes civil pick-up of public inebriates, and the Hennepin County Alcoholism Receiving Center
staffs a Civil Pick-up Van designed to reduce pressure on the
Minneapolis Police Department in the downtown section of the
city (First Precinct) where it is most acute. 22 Finally, in addition to these approved responses, we investigated whether the
police in either jurisdiction are charging public inebriates with
other misdemeanors such as disorderly conduct or vagrancy.
A.

Washington, D.C.

In Washington, D.C., we did not expect microanalysis to require substantial alteration in our original finding of a significant decline in the number of public inebriates formally
handled by the state. Although the new legislation authorized
alternative dispositions, we detected no administrative initiative on the part of public health or police personnel to implement any of these options. Indeed, our exhaustive evaluation
of these alternatives revealed neither records nor other evidence that they were used extensively in the post-reform era
(Aaronson et al., 1977b:116-45).
As for control factors, the size of the problem drinking population in Washington, D.C., has shown a yearly increase ever
since 1960, when such estimates were first calculated by the
public health community in the District. 23 Thus the decline in
police intake following decriminalization cannot be attributed
to a decrease in public intoxication.
22. The "law on the books" in Minnesota grants broad discretionary powers to
the police by including another approved option: "leave the person where
he is found" (Hospitalization and Commitment Act § 253A.04).
23. Based on the Jellinek Formula for estimating alcoholism rates for populations by Dr. D. Mindlin, Director for the Adams Mill Alcoholism Center,
Washington, D.C. For an explanation of the Jellinek Formula, see Jellinek, 1960.
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Our dependent variable in the foregoing research has been
"rate of intake" rather than the number of different
individuals picked up in each period. Perhaps the same
number of different individuals is being picked up in the two
periods but the rate of recidivism has declined after the reform.
Although this is unlikely since decriminalization restricts involuntary commitment to 72 hours, we estimated the number of
individuals the police processed in four years prior to the reform (1964, 1966, 1967, 1968)24 and compared these findings with
the yearly recidivism rates for the D.C. Detoxification Center
(1969-1973).25 As shown in Tables 1 and 2, the recidivism rates
TABLE 1
ESTIMATE OF RECIDIVISM RATE FOR INDIVIDUALS
ARRESTED BY POLICE PRIOR TO REFORM
Court Sample
Recidivism Rateb

Estimation of
c
Individuals Arrested

44,107

1.58

27,916

42,189
31,860

2.59
1.48

14,354

1.23

Year

Rate of
Arresta

1964
1966
1967d
1968e

16,289
21,527
11,670

a. Based on official statistics of the Metropolitan Police Department, which
are compiled on an FY basis.A rough conversion, using 50 percent of each
FY has been made to render these data congruent with the court data.
b. Based on sample of arrested individuals, D.C. Court of General Sessions,
by calendar year.
c. Rate of arrest divided by court sample recidivism rate.
d. Reduction from previous year is possibly attributable to police confusion
over Easter and the general braking effect of this judicial mandate.
e. Reduction from previous year is due to the cessation of arrest on August
1, the effective date of the Alcoholic Rehabilitation Act.

TABLE 2
RECIDIVISM RATE FOR INDIVIDUALS DELIVERED TO THE
DETOXIFICATION CENTER, FOLLOWING REFORM

a.

Individuals
Admitteda

Year

Rate of
Admission

Recidivism

1969

11,695

3.03

3856

1970

14,293

3.32

4310

1971
1972

14,845
12,465

3.15
2.87

4707
4345

1973

10,436

2.68

3893

Official statistics of the D.C. Men's Detoxification Center.

24. Since police have no record of the number of individuals they processed
for this charge prior to the reform, we used the index to the records of the
D.C. Court of General Sessions which lists the cases for each calendar
year in alphabetical order by individual name. Individuals with multiple
arrests are more likely to be processed in the courts, whereas more affluent single offenders may prefer to forfeit their collateral rather than be exposed to prosecution. Therefore, we have overestimated prereform
recidivism, biasing the evidence so as not to favor our research hypothesis.
25. Statistics are available for the number of individuals admitted to the Detoxification Center each year after the reform.
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are uniformly higher following the reform, and therefore the revolving door argument fails to explain the discrepancy in police
intake between the two periods.
GRAPH 5
DISORDERLY CONDUCT ARRESTS, REPORTED BY METROPOLITAN
a
POLICE DEPARTMENT, FISCAL YEARS, 1960-1973b
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a. Figures are official statistics of Metropolitan Police Department, Washington, D.C., Annual Reports, 1960-1973. The yearly arrest rate for the
first full year of decriminalization (1969) was designated as "0." All other
arrest rates were recalculated to represent a percentage increase or decrease from that year's rate.
b. Dotted line represents approximate arrest rate for 1971, excluding May
Day demonstration arrests.

GRAPH 6
VAGRANCY ARRESTS, REPORTED BY METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT,a FISCAL YEARS, 1960-1973
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a. Figures are official statistics of Metropolitan Police Department, Washington, D.C., Annual Reports, 1960-1973. The yearly arrest rate for the
first full year of decriminalization (1969) was designated as "0." All other
arrest rates were recalculated to represent a percentage increase or decrease from that year's rate.
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Finally, we investigated the rival hypothesis that the police
and the courts have been processing public inebriates under
other criminal offenses since the reform. All court personnel
interviewed denied that this was the case; indeed many pointed
out that removal of public drunkeness as a criminal offense
was primarily responsible for reducing the case backlog in the
Criminal Division of the Superior Court. Some argued that because disorderly conduct and vagrancy had previously been
charged against public inebriates the reform had reduced these
offenses as well.
We obtained official police statistics to probe these assertions, and found that disorderly conduct and vagrancy charges
have decreased substantially in the post-reform periods (see
Graphs 5 and 6). The sharp increase in disorderly conduct arrests in fiscal year 1971 (see Graph 5) is probably attributable
to police actions against antiwar demonstrations, since more
than 9,000 of the arrests took place during the month of the
"May Day Demonstrations" in Washington, D.C., and the other,
frequent antiwar demonstrations during the early 1970s could
well explain the failure of the disorderly conduct arrest rate to
return to the 1969-70 level. But despite the numerous arrests
of demonstrators, disorderly conduct arrest levels are consistently lower after the reform than they were before it, with the
single exception of the 1971 May Day inflation. The virtual disappearance of vagrancy arrests (see Graph 6) may well be due
to the declining use of this offense as a result of court decisions
holding such statutes unconstitutional (see, e.g., Papachriston
v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 1972). In any case, the
data do not suggest the use of vagrancy as a substitute for the
public drunkenness charge.
If the police are paying less attention to the problem of
public inebriation, what criteria guide their allocation of resources, and how have these changed since the reform? We hypothesized that the decline in the number of inebriates
formally processed by the police would be accompanied by an
increasing emphasis on the emergency case, the skid-row
drunk, for whom some action is required and no adequate alternative is readily available.
Washington, D.C., is the only jurisdiction in which we were
able to investigate the "qualitative impact" of decriminalization
by studying existing reports on the public inebriate population
and collecting original data on the characteristics of those
processed for public intoxication before and after the reform.
The Committee on Prisons, Probation and Parole found that
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58.2 percent of the individuals picked up for public intoxication
in the District of Columbia during 1956 either forfeited their
collateral, were fined or were released (1957:89). The Committee contrasted these "social drinkers" with 41.8 percent of inebriates committed to the Workhouse, whom it divided into
three categories.
Many are relatively youthful offenders who are simply intoxicated at
the time of arrest; a somewhat larger group are problem drinkers, bordering on chronic alcoholism-but who have families, job prospects,
and a desire to get back home and back to work; finally, the great majority of the approximately 14,000 intoxicants committed each year to
the Workhouse are chronic skid-row alcoholics. [1957:103]

The report thus indicates that the police picked up a range
of public inebriates and did not concentrate solely on the
chronic skid-row inebriate. On the other hand, a study of those
entering the Alcoholic Detoxification Center after the reform
reveals a more homogenous population.
The composite picture is that of a black man, not married, who tends to
be in his mid-forties, having completed ten years of education, of low
socio-economic status ....
He has an average of 18 prior admissions to
the Alcoholic Detoxification Center. [Research and Statistics Division,
1974] 26

We then drew random samples of individuals arrested by
the police during two years prior to the reform (1963-1967)27
TABLE 3
BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS OF PERSONS ARRESTED BY
POLICE AND ADMITTED TO DETOXIFICATION CENTER
Persons Arrested
by Police prior
to Reform
Mean Age
Race
Black
White
Other
No occupation,
unskilled, or
semiskilled
Marital statusa
Married
Divorced or
separated

Persons Admitted
to Detoxification
Center after Reform

43

44.4

51%

60.8%
37.8%
1.4%

64.1%

64.9%

38.8%
9.0%

17.9%
60.0%

(N varies between
376-412)

(N=766)

a. Major shifts in separation and divorce rates have occurred throughout
society, which may partly explain this difference.
26. These 18 admissions represent a lifetime experience for 500 public inebriates and should not be confused with the annual recidivism rates reported
in Table 2.
27. Police arrest records are generally filled with inaccuracies because officers
rely on the integrity of the arrested individual for background information.
Nevertheless, these are the only available source for these data.
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and of those admitted to the Detoxification Center during five
subsequent years (1969-73), comparing their backgrounds in
terms of indicators often associated with skid-row inebriates:
low socioeconomic status and undersocialization (Straus, 1974)
(we were unable to measure the third indicator, institutional
dependency). There are few significant differences in most
background variables between these two periods, with the exception of marital status. The composite picture of the public
inebriate admitted to the Detoxification Center is a black male
in his mid-forties, single or separated, with little education and
low occupational skills, who resides in those parts of the city
28
with the highest level of health problems.
These traits characterize the skid-row public inebriate.
Others rarely find their way into the Detoxification Center. Indeed former Police Chief Jerry Wilson believed that one purpose of the Alcoholic Rehabilitation Act was to create an
alternative means for servicing skid-row inebriates:
Of course, the language of the ARA avoids saying directly that it is the
homeless, derelict inebriate who is to be taken to the Detoxification
Center for treatment. But when you think of the discussions that led
up to the ARA and to its actual language, you can construct an argument that the underlying intent is that the Detoxification Center will
deal primarily with the derelict. For example, there is the provision
for taking or sending the intoxicated individual home as an alternative
to the Detoxification Center. Clearly, this is intended and functions to
excuse most persons who have homes from what really amounts to an
arrest and incarceration. In practice, of course, the police rarely take
inebriates home, but instead send them home by putting them in taxicabs or turning them over to friends or else indirectly send them home
simply by letting them go on their way so long as they are not staggering through traffic. [1975:19]

Despite the limitations of our datai, it appears one consequence of decriminalization has been to focus the energies of
the police'upon skid-row alcoholics, to the neglect of other public inebriates. This is disturbing for two reasons. First, it frustrates the primary goal of the reform-rehabilitation and
resocialization. These policies are least likely to succeed with
the skid-row alcoholic, who is being admitted to the Detoxification Center, and most likely to succeed with those who are being overlooked by the police. Second, it increases, rather than
28. We plotted the addresses of those admitted to the Center in terms of the
service areas of the Department of Human Resources. The service area
with the highest rate of socioeconomic health related problems (the Model
Cities Area, which also contains the Center) was the residence of 29.1 percent of admittees; 63.7 percent of admittees reside in the three most deprived service areas.
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reduces, the violation of constitutional principles by depriving
skid-row alcoholics of equal protection of law.
B.

Minneapolis

As in the District of Columbia, neither of the control factors explains the discrepancy in intake between the two periods. The problem drinking population has slightly increased
since decriminalization 29 and public drunkenness recidivism
rates are substantially higher (see Table 4).
TABLE 4
COMPARISON OF PUBLIC DRUNKENNESS

RECIDIVISM

RATES UNDER THE CRIMINAL LAW AND SINCE DECRIMINALIZATION

Year

Rate of
Arrest/
Admission

Number of
Individuals

Estimated
Recidivism

Estimation of
Individualsc

1967a
1970 a

7670
7394

145
176

3.79
3.94

2024
1877

1972b

2270

176

4.71

482

1974b

2094

151

5.03

416

a. Based on Official Arrest Records, Minneapolis Police Department,
Bureau of Identifications.
b. Based on Official Records, Alcoholism Receiving Center, Department of
MH/MR/CD.
c. Rate of arrest divided by recidivism rate.

Although we found little incidence of home deliveries or
use of other health facilities by the Minneapolis Police (Aaronson et al., 1977b:248-53), our investigation of alternative dispositions by the Alcoholism Receiving Center (ARC) did produce
significant findings. Unlike most treatment programs which
rely almost totally on police departments for their intake,
ARC's staff has aggressively sought to attract clients. 30 The development of the Civil Pick-up Service was designed to reduce
pressure on the Minneapolis Police Department in the downtown section of the city (First Precinct) where street inebriate
problems are most acute (Boche, 1975). And the ARC has encouraged problem drinkers from more stable socioeconomic
29. Robert Olander, Research Sociologist for the Department of Mental
Health, Mental Retardation, and Chemical Dependency, applied the standard Jellinek formula to the mean adult population in Hennepin County
for the two periods 1965-70 and 1971-75, drawn from the yearly census, and
arrived at estimates of potential problem drinkers of 37,346 and 38,390.
This finding is strengthened by the fact that Hennepin County registered a
slight decrease in population between 1971 and 1975.
30. Interview with Leonard Boche, Director, Department of MH/MR/CD, Minneapolis, (June 3, 1975).
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backgrounds to admit themselves, using advertising and working closely with business and with government agencies. 3 1 We
therefore speculated that such a high involvement by the public health community might compensate for the reduction in
police attention to this problem.
Graph 7 shows that this is in fact what occurred. 32 Before
GRAPH 7
PUBLIC DRUNKENNESS ARRESTSa POLICE INTAKES (p),b AND
ALL NONPOLICE REFERRALS (R) TO ALCOHOLISM RECEIVING
CENTER
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a. Figures are total drunkenness arrests, official statistics of the Minneapolis Police Department, Annual Reports, 1960-1975.
b. Figures are all police deliveries, comparison statistics, Alcoholism Receiving Center, 1971-1975.
c. Figures are civil pick-ups, self-admissions, and other means of nonpolice
intake combined, comparison statistics, Alcoholism Receiving Center,
1971-1975.

31. Interview with Paul Thorne, Director, Alcoholism Receiving Center, Minneapolis (June 5, 1975).
32. Only yearly data are available: T = .16, df = 11 + 5 - 2 = 14, p =N.S. Thus,
there is no significant difference in pick-ups between the two periods
when one adds the intake generated by the efforts of the Alcoholism Receiving Center staff.

428

12 LAW & SOCIETY / SPRING 1978

the initiation of the Civilian Pick-up service "the Minneapolis
Police Department accounted for 40% of the total admissions
and 60% of admissions from 4:00 P.M. to 12:00 P.M." (Boche,
1975:1). Thereafter "the Pick-up Team transported almost 50%
of the total admissions to the Center and 80% of police and
team admissions combined" for the same hours (Boche,
1975:2). Statistics collected by ARC show that the Civilian
Pick-up Service has actually increased total admissions while
further reducing police involvement. For example, in June
through August of 1974 "the total number of admissions to the
Center increased 17% (from 2299 to 2689) while police referrals
were reduced to 480 admissions" (Boche, 1975:4). During the
first eight months of 1974, Civilian Pick-up admissions increased from 19 percent of total admissions to 27 percent while
police admissions were reduced from 23 to 17 percent (Boche,
1975:4).
It should be stressed, however, that persons who admit
themselves to the ARC (approximately half of the total admissions during this period) may be a different population from
the typical skid-row inebriate. To the extent that this is so, we
have not yet fully accounted for the inebriate population previously handled by the police. Perhaps the police have diverted
their energies to controlling public inebriates with minor criminal charges. Indeed, public health officials suggested that subsequent to decriminalization the police were arresting a
considerable number of public inebriates for disorderly conduct and relasing them before a court appearance was re33
quired.
We obtained official police statistics on disorderly conduct

and vagrancy. The findings displayed in Graphs 8 and 9
strongly indicate that the police are arresting public inebriates
for disorderly conduct. Although vagrancy arrests have shown
a steady decline since 1960, disorderly conduct arrests have significantly increased since decriminalization. 3 4 From 1960 to
1966, the yearly average for disorderly conduct arrests was 697;
during the transitional period following the introduction of
precourt screening (1967-70) this average increased to 1167;
since decriminalization. (1971-75) it has jumped to 1875.
Thus, in order to keep the streets clear of skid-row inebriates,
and because of overcrowding at the Alcoholism Receiving
Center, the police have come to rely on disorderly conduct arrests as a means of control.
33. Interview with Leonard Boche (supra note 30).
34. Monthly disorderly conduct arrest data were collected. The estimated intervention effect is +72.62 police arrests (T=6.61, degrees of freedom =
34).
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GRAPH 8
DISORDERLY ARRESTS, REPORTED BY THE MINNEAPOLIS POLICE
a
FISCAL YEARS, 1960-1975
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a. Figures are yearly statistics, official statistics of the Minneapolis Police
Department, Annual Reports, 1960-1975. The yearly arrest rate for the
year of decriminalization (1971) was designated as "0." All other arrest
rates were recalculated to represent a percentage increase or decrease
from that year's rate.

GRAPH 9
VAGRANCY ARRESTS, REPORTED BY THE MINNEAPOLIS POLICE
a
DEPARTMENT, FISCAL YEARS, 1963-1975
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a. Figures are yearly statistics, official statistics of the Minneapolis Police
Department, Annual Reports, 1963-1975. The yearly arrest rate for the
year of decriminalization (1971) was designated as "0." All other arrest
rates were recalculated to represent a percentage increase or decrease
from that year's rate.
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V. CONCLUSION
Our multiple time-series analysis does confirm a statistically significant decline in the number of public inebriates formally handled by the police in the manner designated by the
"law in the books." This finding raises serious doubts about
the use of police to implement noncriminal regulations and
lends considerable support to our proposition that decriminalization introduces a mass of disincentives to formally approved
police intervention. However, our comparative analysis does
not lead to the conclusion that more inebriates necessarily will
be left on the street after decriminalization. As revealed in our
microanalyses of the experimental jurisdictions, proactive behavior by the public health community (e.g., the use of a civilian intake van and the encouragement of self-admissions) does
compensate for reduced police attention in Minneapolis.
Certain environmental differences between the two cities
may partially account for the disparity in pickup practices. Until the late 1960s, the Minneapolis Police Department and community leaders tolerated the existence of "safe zones" where
skid-row inebriates could freely congregate and reside unnoticed by most citizens. A small "hobo haven" was located on
property owned by the Great Northern Railroad, but the greatest number of transient drinkers lived on Nicollet Island, situated in the Mississippi River where it passes through
Minneapolis. Over the years this area evolved into an unofficial shanty town for transients, with flophouses, shacks, and
even liquor stores. Although a few old houses still stand, the
city has now virtually leveled the island and is redeveloping it
as an outdoor art and recreation area. This drove the inebriate
population into the thriving downtown commercial and business district, which was revitalized in the early 1970s. Strong
business protests as well as increased numbers of complaints
have placed the police under heavy pressure to keep the
streets clear of inebriates who offend shoppers. 35 This probably
explains the police department's use of disorderly conduct
charges to detain public inebriates overnight when the detoxification facility is full or is unwilling to handle some of the more
troublesome transients.
In the District of Columbia, the Metropolitan Police Department can rely on more informal mechanisms to keep public
inebriates out of the downtown tourist and business district.
This important commercial area is part of a larger subdivision
35. Interview with Paul Thorne (supra note 31).
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of Washington that contains many pockets of extreme poverty
characterized by abandoned buildings and vacant lots (Aaronson et al., 1977b:112-13). These blighted area neighborhoods
are within easy walking distance of the major commercial district. At present they are "safe zones" for public inebriates
and police use such informal tactics as "moving transients
along" in order to keep them away from commercially important thoroughfares. Direct observation by our research teams,
as well as interviews with police and public health officials in
the city, confirm the conclusion that public inebriates are permitted to congregage in these areas (Aaronson et al.,
1977b:141).
Differences in the availability of public health resources for
inebriates may also help to account for the higher intake rate in
Minneapolis. Public health officials in both communities have
been outspoken about the limited bed space in their facilities.
But in 1974, Minneapolis opened a second facility, Southside
Detox, principally serving the Native American population in
the Model Cities area. 36 And Hennepin County public health
officials have recently drawn up plans for a series of "satellite
facilities" to decentralize services to the public inebriate population. In Washington by contrast, public health officials have
obtained no increase in resources since the initial funding of
the Detoxification Center.
Finally, decriminalization provided the police command in
Washington with an opportunity to shift priorities at a time
when the department was under heavy pressure to handle massive demonstrations and fight street crime. The Minneapolis
Police Department experienced no such competing demands
for its services. On the contrary, urban renewal coupled with
the loss of the criminal sanction for public drunkenness placed
increased pressures on the Minneapolis force to remove inebriates from the streets. Neither the proponents of decriminalization nor the police fully anticipated these historically specific
37
factors.

36. Interview with Marvin Mannypenny, Director, Southside Detox, Minneapolis (July 7, 1975).
37. In this paper we have not attempted to develop alternative solutions to the
problems created by decriminalization. However, we have written a prescriptive paper on this subject, see Aaronson et al. (1977a, 1978).
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APPENDIX
MONTHLY POLICE INTAKE RATES FOR ALL CITIES
1966
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December

Washington, D.C.

Minneapolis

2581
3352
4156
3994
4391
3274
4628
4502
4705
4438
3737
3382

529
567
747
719
707
728
758
746
725
725
555
526

1967
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December

2845
2368
3039
3055
2698
2481
3133
3896
3778
3968
3566
2412

612
570
597
666
677
651
736
757
708
601
569
526

1968
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December

1635
1840
2347
2228
2457
2245
1966
2915
2537
2631
1794
2049

538
525
668
692
762
693
775
843
578
708
434
489

1969
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December

254
367
481
621
613
489
1313
1520
703
465
526
445

San Francisco

Houston

2639
2225
2435
2445
2489
1974
2021
2062
1887
2138
1961
1994
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Washington, D.C.

Minneapolis

San Francisco

1970
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December

1086
1411
721
343
460
714
738
675
747
785
650
730

1971
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December

603
704
920
1080
942
873
941
975
868
835
690
916

1972
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December

710
670
776
896
880
719
724
776
810
748
660
622

1213
1431
1417
1095
1254
1091
1162
1182
1065
1253
1209
1008

1973
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December

587
613
682
719
688
626
639
612
574
644
588
596

1306
1306
1272
1185
1060
1134
1284
1083
1208
1312
1246
1222
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Houston

2386
2209
2592
2665
2709
2582
2497
2809
2859
2996
2505
3072
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MONTHLY POLICE INTAKE RATES FOR ALL CITIES
Washington, D.C.
1974
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December

557
543
745
692
773
659
604
661
668
621
562
580

1975
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December

573
578
651
729
585
707
581
576
641
592
446
542

Minneapolis
191
175
183
208
182
154
193
133

San Francisco

Houston

1167
1030
1123
1228
1116
972
1225
1141
1480
1389
1348
1367

2062
2009
2342
2034
2152
2244
1933
2239
2075
2107
2079
2038

1294
1050
1294
1249
1339
1281
1232
801
1074
1136
1348
1367

2633
2136
2383
2320
2387
2211

1976
January
February
March
April
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